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Abstract Written in the context of the global hegemony of neoliberal education 
policy agendas, with their emphases on standards, accountability and choice, this 
paper has two related foci. In the first section I explore Lacanian ideas of extimacy, 
excess and Möbius subjectivity to subvert a simplistic self-other dichotomy and 
briefly consider some implications of this subversion for neoliberal educational 
policy. In the second part of the paper, I extend the critique of neoliberal education 
policy by examining it through the lens of Lacan’s four discourses. This involves 
viewing neoliberal policy agendas in terms of “discourses of mastery,” before 
turning to “discourses of thinking otherwise” as a way of thinking what “the other 
side of education” might look like.
Keywords Education policy, psychoanalysis, neoliberalism, politics
We need to create more new schools to generate innovation, raise 
expectations, give parents choice and drive up standards through 
competition. (Gove, 2012)
The idea that knowledge can, in any way or at any time, even as a 
hope for the future, form a closed whole – now there’s something that 
didn’t have to wait for psychoanalysis for it to appear questionable.
(Lacan, 2007, p. 30)
Introduction
At first glance, my two epigraphs above may not appear to have a particular 
connection, beyond a broad concern with knowledge. For the purposes of this 
paper, however, they represent two opposing perspectives on education. The first, 
from a recent speech by UK Secretary of State for Education, Michael Gove, 
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bullishly recites touchstones of the by now all-too-familiar neoliberal education 
agenda: accountability, choice, standards and competition. By contrast, Lacan’s 
somewhat elliptical and elusive comment suggests skepticism about – perhaps even 
subversion of – the comprehensive and confident ambitions of the former. This 
paper explores the implications of some key Lacanian themes, particularly the 
notion of the other and its relations to knowledge, truth and subjectivity in his 
theory of the four discourses, considering what critical insights they might offer in 
relation to the increasingly hegemonic agendas of neoliberal education policy. In 
conducting this critique, the paper seeks to explore potential insights and 
implications that a Lacanian psychoanalytic reading of the other and otherness 
might hold for “the very thought of education.”1 For, if “aesthetics was born as a 
discourse of the body” (Eagleton, 1990, p. 3), education – with its structuring tropes 
of development, progress, and completion, and its normative technologies of 
calculation and comparison – might be described as a discourse born of “the other.”
The Shadow of the Other
Of course, our inscription by the other precedes our entry into formal education. As 
Britzman observes, “we are born and enlivened by our first other’s 
readings…telegraphing our needs, demands, and desires,” whilst simultaneously 
being invested with “hopes for what language, knowledge and the other can bring” 
(2009, p. 2). Lacanian psychoanalytic theory provides one explanation of this 
constitutive otherness through the familiar narrative of the mirror stage. Emerging 
from a undifferentiated state of unity with the (m)other, the developing child’s 
initial engagement with the separateness of its being is the result of an encounter 
with its reflected image, be this a literal mirror image or one conveyed in 
communication with others. The contrast between the gestalt of the mirror-image 
and the child’s ongoing bodily experience of disunity and fragmentation ensnares it 
in a paradoxical space of recognition/misrecognition (Grosz, 1990), initiating a 
sense of alienation that is redoubled with the child’s entry into the symbolic system, 
whose existence precedes and exceeds its own, and over which it has only limited 
control. We might thus say that otherness casts a double shadow on the self:
First the self is constituted by the identifications with the other that it 
deploys in an ongoing way, in particular to deny the loss and 
uncontrollability that otherness necessarily brings. Second, it is 
reciprocally constituted in relation to the other, depending on the 
other’s recognition, which it cannot have without being negated, acted 
on by the other, in a way that changes the self, making it nonidentical.
(Benjamin, 1998, p. 79)
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Given the salience of the constitutive role of the other in the formation of subjects 
and their desires as a central motif in Lacanian psychoanalytic theory (see for 
example Bracher, 1993; Fink, 1995), and given that the Lacanian subject of 
knowledge is also the subject of desire – which is always desire of the other
(Campbell, 2004, p. 70; Van Haute, 2002, pp. 124-125) – this paper has two related 
foci. In the first section I explore Lacanian ideas of extimacy, excess and Möbius 
subjectivity to subvert a simplistic self-other dichotomy and briefly consider some 
implications of this subversion for neoliberal educational policy. In the second part 
of the paper, I extend the critique of neoliberal education policy by examining it 
through the lens of Lacan’s four discourses as a way of thinking what “the other 
side of education” might look like.
Otherness and the Subject of Education: Extimacy, Excess and Möbius 
Subjectivity
Contemporary neoliberal education policies embody contradictory notions of the 
subject of education. On the one hand, discourses of competition and choice rely on 
the notion of an autonomous rational actor exercising full and free agency as it 
navigates its chosen educational course in order to maximize its outcomes. On the 
other hand, discourses of standards, quality, and accountability can be read as the 
subordination of this same self to the “other,” who determines and dispenses 
knowledge in the form of mandated curriculum, and who monitors its achievement 
through tests and targets. In each case, whether we are dealing with undue emphasis 
on subjectivity or objectivity, the result is an inadequate notion of education that 
fails to do justice to the complexity of our individual and social existence. My first 
move then is to offer an alternative to this dichotomy drawing on notions of 
extimate causality and the möbius subject from Molly Anne Rothenberg’s recent 
(2010) synthesis of psychoanalysis and social theory.
In her discussion of the relationship between individual subject formation and 
social causality, Rothenberg highlights the problems with, on the one hand, models 
of external causation in which the separation of causes from effects leads to the 
positing of a boundary between the two that is at once impermeable and porous, 
and, on the other hand, models of immanent causality in which “causes and their 
effects mutually condition one another, making it impossible ultimately to 
distinguish one from the other” (Rothenberg, 2010, p. 30). Classical Marxism, with 
its determination of the social and ideological superstructure by the entirely separate 
realm of the economic base, provides an example of the former, which Rothenberg 
calls the two-tier model; whilst Foucault’s theory of immanent power relations 
pervading the entire social body is an example of the latter, which Rothenberg calls 
the one-tier model. Rothenberg’s Lacanian “solution” to this dilemma draws on 
topology by way of the analogy of the “unbounded” Möbius band, formed by 
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twisting a rectangular band of paper and gluing its two ends together. As a result, 
inside and outside flow seamlessly into one another and any specific point on the 
surface of the band is “excessive” with respect to its sidedness, neither purely inside 
nor outside. As Rothenberg argues, “the Möbius band suggests a field in which both 
the paradoxical boundary of external causation and infinite mutual implication of 
cause and effect of immanentism cease to be problematic” (Rothenberg, 2010, p. 
31). If we take the Möbius band as a model of subjectivity, we have the means to 
conceive of a subject who subject retains traces of “negativity” as a constitutive 
condition of its positive contents, who contains unique, intimate (originating inside) 
alongside universal, “extimate” (originating outside) elements, and who, as a result, 
is neither purely rational agent nor discursively constructed object.
The Möbius subject provides us with conceptual tools that challenge neoliberal 
education policy’s reliance on the self-sufficient and self-interested rational subject, 
whilst also exposing the inadequacy of its focus on externally determined curricula 
and standards that are developed without reference to the experiences of students or 
teachers. More specifically, the blurring of internal/external boundaries inherent to 
the Möbius subject and the notion of an excess attaching to all subjects highlight 
how the other is constitutive of the self, meaning that there can be no “pure” (e.g. 
national) educational identities. The educational consequences of this move are 
profound. In one stroke, a number of neoliberal shibboleths, each of which 
represses the constitutive otherness at the heart of subjectivity in some way, are 
subverted. These include the assumptions operating in policies of choice and 
competition, of a “level” social playing field upon which autonomous rational 
agents choose and compete on equal terms, or the positing of a notional generic 
student (or teacher) who serves as the target of standardized national/state curricula 
and testing regimes. Such assumptions become untenable when we recognize how 
the other lies at the heart of subjectivity, how the educational subject is always the 
subject of language and discourse and is therefore always already situated: 
economically, socially, historically, culturally, sexually and politically. The 
remainder of the discussion turns to Lacan’s theory of discourse, which offers 
conceptual tools with which to critique the exclusion of the other in neoliberal 
education policies, whilst also suggesting ways of reinserting the other into 
educational policy and practice.
Lacan’s Four Discourses
In The other side of psychoanalysis, Lacan (2007) elaborates his theory of four 
discourses – the discourse of the master, the university, the hysteric and the analyst. 
Since the names Lacan gives them are not exactly self-explanatory, and are in some 
cases potentially misleading, I will provide a short description here, as well as a 
brief discussion of Lacan’s use of the term “discourse” in his theory.
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Each discourse reflects a different possibility for the structuring of social 
relations in society. The master’s discourse relates to mastering or the establishment 
of a hegemony; the university discourse refers to educating or interpellating; the 
hysteric’s discourse concerns protesting or resisting; while the analyst’s discourse 
relates to revolutionizing or bringing about change (Bracher, 1994, p. 107; Brown, 
Atkinson, & England, 2006, p. 128). Overall, Lacan’s theory can be considered a 
“later Lacanian epistemology” (Campbell, 2004, p. 53) but it is not one that defines 
the propositional content of knowledge; rather it “provides an account of the 
intersubjective production of knowledge, and of knowing as a socially mediated 
act” (Campbell, 2004, p. 57). It thus offers a dynamic perspective on the 
relationship between discourse, subjectivity and social practice. More specifically, 
each of the four discourses describes the schematic positioning of four elements. 
These include the knowing subject ($), which is located in relation to its knowledge 
(S2), its master signifiers (S1), and that which its knowledge excludes (a).
Each of the four discourses involves these four elements rotating through four 
positions. These four positions, or roles, include: 1) the place of agency or 
dominance from which the discourse emanates; 2) the addressee, the other to whom 
discourse is addressed; 3) the place of production, representing the by-product, or 
loss, resulting from this interchange; and 4) the place of truth, representing the 
factors underpinning, yet repressed by, the agency or dominance in 1). These 
positions or roles are arranged in each of the four discourses in terms of a schema as 
follows:
1) the place of agency 2) the other
_________________________ ___________________
4) the underlying truth 3) the by-product/loss
The positions within the schema are significant: the left hand side of the schema 
designates the productive factors in the discourse while the right hand side 
designates the receptive factors. On the other hand, the top position on each side 
represents the conscious or explicit factors while the bottom positions represent the 
unconscious or implicit factors. 
A number of significant enigmas and omissions surround the four discourses, 
for instance, why four (and only four) and why these four (Campbell, 2004, p. 57)? 
Despite their origins in the psychoanalytic clinic, Lacan clearly related these 
discourses to political patterns, both historical and contemporary, linking, for 
example, the university discourse to Stalinism (Lacan, 2007, p. 206), a potential that 
Žižek (e.g. 1996), in particular, has built on and extended. Thus, my reason for 
using Lacan’s theory is not because it can claim any status as a meta-theory in 
relation to other theories of discourse, “but because it allows us to understand the 
functioning of different discourses in a unique way” (Fink, 1995, p.129). In 
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particular, it provides unique insights into the interrelationships between 
knowledge, truth, subjectivity and otherness, and how particular configurations 
among these elements are produced by different discourses. In the context of the 
predominant discourse in contemporary education policy i.e. neoliberalism, Lacan’s 
discourse theory helps us in grasping – and hence potentially resisting – the nature 
and dynamics of its hegemonic influence.
Neoliberal Education Policy: Discourses of Mastery
Whilst recognizing that, as Stephen Ball puts it, neoliberalism “is one of those terms 
that is used so widely and so loosely that it is in danger of becoming meaningless” 
(2012, p. 3), I would argue that it is nonetheless a key term insofar as it references 
the colonisation of social and material life by particular politico-economic 
ideologies. Indeed, neoliberalism might well be defined as economic 
fundamentalism. As Jodi Dean puts it, “redefining social and ethical life in 
accordance with economic criteria and expectations, neoliberalism holds that human 
freedom is best achieved through the operation of markets” (2009, p. 51). 
Such economic fundamentalism has achieved ascendancy across a range of 
international contexts and a range of fields, including education, leading 
commentators to talk of a globalised neoliberal policy space in education. As Rizvi 
and Lingard argue, “just as a social imaginary of neoliberal globalization has been a 
central component in the creation of the global market, so it has been within the 
global field of education policy. A global field of education policy is now 
established” (2010, p. 67). Signature traits of this global “policy convergence” in 
education include a number of key overarching policy themes – accountability, 
competition, and privatization (Rancière, 2010, p. 19) – that are manifested in a 
number of intersecting educational policies typically pursued by neoliberal 
governments.
These policies include the imposition of standardised curricula on schools, 
teachers and students, monitored by high-stakes testing regimes for students and 
performativity-oriented evaluation and accountability measures for schools and 
teachers. They also include the encouragement of more diverse forms of school 
provision in order to, to cite Michael Gove again (2012), “generate innovation, raise 
expectations, give parents choice and drive up standards through competition,”
alongside managerialist-inspired policies, such as the devolution of budgetary 
responsibilities to principals.
As suggested already, Lacanian discourse theory, and the two discourses of 
mastery, those of the master and the university in particular, provide powerful 
insights into contemporary globalized neoliberal policy discourses in education. The 
master’s discourse is associated with self-identity, self-assurance and control of 
others. The political analogy would be the absolute monarch who, like the 
domineering parent or teacher, must be obeyed because of who they are, not 
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because their pronouncements are underpinned by valid knowledge (Sharpe & 
Boucher, 2010; Žižek, 2008). The master’s discourse is represented schematically 
as follows:
1) S1 2) S2
________________ ĺ ________________
4) $ ĸ 3) a
In the master’s discourse, hegemonic and univocal master signifiers, S1, address and 
organize the field of discourse, S2. Yet this purported mastery relies on the 
concealment and repression of subjective division, $, whilst generating the by-
product, a, the object of desire that is lost to the subject (Boucher, 2006).
Lacan believed that modernity involved the displacement of the master’s 
discourse by the university discourse (Boucher, 2006), though the master’s 
discourse remains central insofar as it dominates the other three discourses 
(Clemens & Grigg, 2006). Critically, the displacement of the master’s discourse by 
that of the university should not lead us into thinking that power has been replaced 
by reason, as suggested in dominant liberal narratives:
What Lacan recognizes in the university discourse is a new and 
reformed discourse of the master. In its elementary form, it is a 
discourse that is pronounced from the place of supposedly neutral 
knowledge, the truth of which (hidden below the bar) is Power, that 
is, the master signifier. The constitutive lie of this discourse is that it 
disavows its performative dimension; it always presents, for example, 
that which leads to a political decision, founded on power, as a simple 
insight into the state of things (or public polls, objective reports, and 
so on). (=XSDQþLþS)
A similar point is made by sociologist and political theorist, Colin Crouch, who 
highlights the technocratic aspirations of third-way politicians as they “try to put 
issues beyond the range of conflict and debate, and beyond the reach of difficult 
ethical choices” by substituting “rational,” “scientific” neoliberal economic theory 
for contingent and contestable political decision making. Such depoliticization has 
also been a marked feature of neoliberal education policies, underpinned by a 
discursive duopoly of instrumental and consensual discourses (Clarke, 2012). Yet as 
Crouch goes on to note, “these attempts must always fail, as it is not possible to put 
human life on a technocratic automatic pilot” (Crouch, 2011, pp. 91-92). 
The failure of such attempts is central to the university discourse, which is 
represented schematically as follows:
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1) S2 2) a
_________________ ĺ _________________
4) S1 ĸ 3) $
It is important to note that the university discourse is not tied to the institution we 
know as the university. Thus, commentators have also linked it to Stalin’s political 
regime – with its domination by expert knowledge embodied in official public 
discourses, addressing subjects as totalized, “authentic” revolutionary objects, 
whilst producing terrorized subjects as its by-product – as well as to the dominance 
of bureaucracy and consumerism in the contemporary world (Boucher, 2006; Dean, 
2006; Sharpe & Boucher, 2010; Žižek, 2006, 2008). In each case, expert 
knowledge, disavowing its reliance on power, addresses the excluded remainder, 
attempting to incorporate it – and thus to enact and reproduce the knowledge system 
of S2 – within a completely sutured symbolic identity: the fully satisfied consumer; 
the fully integrated worker of the knowledge economy; the totally mobilized 
member of the socialist collective; the effective teacher. Yet ironically, this address 
can also be read as directed towards the subject solely in terms of its object-like 
qualities, or what Agamben refers to as “bare life” (1998), with no recognition of its 
orientation to any higher goals or purposes (Dean, 2006, p. 83). The hollowness of 
this attempt produces the repressed split subject, whilst simultaneously prompting 
the restless revolutionizing and ceaseless change that we see manifested in various 
forms, including capitalism’s excesses and crises, the ever-shifting bureaucratic 
performativity requirements of contemporary accountability regimes, and the 
lifelong learning demanded of today’s always unready educational subjects. 
We gain significant insights into neoliberal education policy discourses when 
they are read in terms of Lacan’s discourse of the university, particularly when we 
recall its links to the dominance of bureaucracy and consumerism in the twenty-first 
century. Specifically, such policies can be understood as dominated by, on the one 
hand, bureaucratic attempts to comprehensively outline knowledge through national 
or state curricula and evaluate it through high-stakes testing regimes, as well as to 
ensure professional compliance with this project via accountability policies; and on 
the other hand, consumerist notions of choice that hold out the promise of complete 
satisfaction of educational desires through the mechanisms of marketization and 
“choice,” whilst interpellating an impoverished rational-individualist vision of the 
subject.
Let’s unpack these ideas in more detail in relation to the schema of the university 
discourse:
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1) S2 2) a
(systemic knowledge: curriculum, professional standards; school choice) (‘learners’, ‘teachers’; ‘parents’)
_____________________________________ ĺ _________________
4) S1 ĸ 3) $
(master signifiers – competition, instrumentalism, individualism) (alienated students, teachers, parents)
Beginning in the upper-left quadrant, the position of agency is occupied by systemic 
knowledge, S2, represented by the comprehensive mapping of knowledge embodied 
in national/state curricula and in teacher professional standards. This systemic 
knowledge addresses idealized and objectified subjects in the form of the successful 
learner (who strives her/his best to master the curriculum and do well in 
examinations), the good teacher (who evinces dedication to her/his students’ 
learning and strives to embody the characteristics of good teaching outlined in 
professional standards documents) or the responsible parent (who is willing to make 
sacrifices to pay for her/his children’s education). In so doing, systemic knowledge 
projects and addresses an idealised vision of the complete, fully realised neoliberal 
subject. But as we have seen, such attempts at discursive colonization, involving a 
characteristic mixture of coercion and seduction (Bracher, 2006, p. 93), inevitably 
fail, with a representing the unassimilable remainder of the Lacanian real, the other, 
which resists co-option into the symbolic system. The resulting by-product is the 
alienated and split-subject, $: the disengaged student, the disaffected teacher, or the 
guilt-ridden parent.
As with technocratic attempts at managing other aspects of public life, such 
attempts at comprehensive mapping inevitably fail because they strive to capture 
and contain that which resists such capture. Another way to think about this and the 
problems resulting from the dominance of the university discourse in education is in 
terms of Elster’s notion of states that are essentially by-products (Elster, 1983; 
Salacl, 1994). The idea here is that certain states of being can only be achieved 
indirectly and that when we attempt to attain them by making them the direct goal 
of our activity, we inevitably miss. Examples of such states include love, 
admiration, and happiness, in that we only achieve these things indirectly when we 
pursue other goals (Kay, 2011). I would argue that education is another example of 
a state that is essentially a by-product, in that education comes about indirectly as a 
result of engagement, inquiry and dialogue in relation to matters that are of 
significance and interest to its participants (Wells, 1999). Without doubt, 
neoliberalism’s efforts to define and manage education through performative 
technologies such as standards, frameworks, targets and outcomes have literally 
missed the point, in the process undermining and diminishing the very thing which 
these efforts purport to value (Biesta, 2010; Fielding & Moss, 2011; Taubman, 
2009). As Rancière notes, “schooling as we know it is dependent upon a calculable 
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if unnoticed absence of true education just as politics as we know it is most often 
dependent upon a similar absence of true politics” (Rancière, 2010, p. 23). But what 
are the alternatives? How can we put the object a, the other, back into the speaking 
position, the position of agency, rather the repression or colonization it suffers in 
the discourses of the master and the university, respectively?
The Other Side of Education: Discourses of Thinking Otherwise
The discourse of the master and the university are what we might describe as 
authoritarian discourses of mastery, insofar as both are dominated by master 
signifiers – whether in the place of agency, as in the discourse of the master, or in 
the place of truth, as in the discourse of the university. These discourses are 
dominated by technocratic and reductive fantasies of the instrumental, competitive, 
accountable and self-responsibilising educational subject. Such reductive visions 
offer pale imitations of the creative and critical, if unruly and imperfect (Todd, 
2009), potential of the Möbius subject of education, whose liminal and paradoxical 
nature cannot be contained within neoliberalism’s prosaic prescriptions. 
In thinking about the challenges of creating an educational discourse that does 
not reproduce the dominance of neoliberalism’s economic and managerialist master 
signifiers and imagining alternatives to today’s technocratic vision of education, I 
want to turn to the other two of Lacan’s four discourses, which we might describe 
as discourses of thinking or knowing otherwise (Campbell, 2004, p. 76), as 
signposts to the other side of education. These are the discourse of the hysteric, 
associated with resistance and protest, and the discourse of the analyst, associated 
with analysis and critique. 
The discourse of the hysteric represents a half-turn, or 180-degree revolution, 
from the discourse of the university characterizing much of contemporary education 
policy discourse and is depicted in the following schema:
1) $ 2) S1
_________________ ĺ _________________
4) a ĸ 3) S2
Here the alienated split subject, $, that was suppressed in the discourses of the 
master and the university, gains expression and assumes the place of agency, 
addressing and confronting the master signifier, S1, in protest at the latter’s lack of 
certainty, harmony and wholeness. Yet the split subject remains in solidarity with 
the master signifier, reflected in their common location in the top half of the 
schema, even as it protests against and resists its particular form of domination. As 
=XSDQþLþ QRWHV LQ UHODWLRQ WR K\VWHULFDO GLVFRXUVH ³WKH WUXWK RI KHU RU KLV EDVLF
complaint about the master is usually that the master is not master enough” (2006, 
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p. 165). For this reason, and because the subject is still underpinned by an 
unacknowledged and repressed other, a, the tendency in this discourse is for the 
subject to seek a new master, new sources of certainty, whilst demonizing the old. 
To the extent that it offers a challenge to established and authoritative systems 
of knowledge in education and their associated dominant master signifiers, while 
promoting acceptance of hitherto excluded knowledge and identities, the discourse 
of the hysteric represents a positive alternative to the two discourses of mastery. 
Indeed, it can be the source of empowerment, both for minority students whose 
knowledge and identities are validated, and for majority students whose resources 
for identification are expanded (Bracher, 2006, p. 96). However, because it is still 
reliant on the dominance of some (other) master, such empowerment is 
accompanied by the potential risks of a tokenism that in reality changes nothing, or 
of the installation of a new inverted hierarchy of dominance and subordination 
grounded in the familiar binaries of good/bad, victims/oppressors, and 
heroes/villains. 
It is only in the discourse of the analyst that the totality and tyranny of the 
master signifiers is at least partially broken – partially that is because the analyst’s 
discourse still involves the operation of master signifiers, but with the critical 
difference that these are more flexible and tentative, being products of the subject of 
knowledge rather than being imposed upon it (Bracher, 1994, p. 124). The discourse 
of the analyst, which stands in opposition and counterpoint to the closure and 
rigidity of the master’s discourse, is represented schematically below:
1) a 2) $
_________________ ĺ _________________
4) S2 ĸ 3) S1
In the discourse of the analyst, surplus desire, a, the other – which was repressed in 
the master’s discourse and colonized in the university discourse – addresses the 
divided subject, $. In part because it is underpinned by knowledge, S2, occupying 
the place of truth, recognizes how the latter’s subjection to the signifier produces 
the split between conscious symbolic knowledge and unconscious desire. 
Meanwhile, the reinscription of the a, that was excluded in the master’s 
discourse and colonized in the university discourse, into the place of agency enables 
the subject to produce new master signifiers, S1, and hence to disrupt and challenge 
the dominance of the master’s discourse: 
The analytic discourse, that is, makes it possible to produce a master 
signifier that is a little less oppressive…less absolute, exclusive and 
rigid in its establishment of the subject’s identity, and more open, 
Matthew Clarke
57
fluid, processual – constituted, in a word, by relativity and textuality. 
(Bracher, 1994, p. 124)
In educational policy terms, this means rethinking the purposes of education in 
ways that more open and exploratory and less closed and certain, more expressive 
and intrinsic and less instrumental and extrinsic; it means thinking how educational 
relationships might become more democratic and egalitarian in orientation and less 
managerial and hierarchical (Fielding & Moss, 2011, p. 68). It means thinking how 
education can be rethought more in terms of a collaborative adventure and less as a 
competitive race. It means placing more emphasis on the virtues of interconnections 
and less on the tyranny of choice.
In pedagogic practice terms, this means not requiring students to conform to 
some pre-established body of knowledge, whether traditional, progressive, or 
critical. Rather, it entails assisting students to recognize the nature and origins of 
their existing knowledge and identities (including imagistic-perceptual and 
affective-physiological, not just linguistic-discursive registers), to build new 
knowledge and identities in proximal or potential zones of development, and to 
understand the implications and consequences of particular knowledge and 
identities for themselves and for others (Bracher, 2006, pp. 103-105). Such an 
approach, combining constructive and deconstructive approaches, echoes Biesta’s 
argument “that education, as distinguished from socialization, that is, from the 
insertion of newcomers into an existing order, entails a responsibility for the 
coming into the world of unique, singular beings” (Biesta, 2006, p. 115). 
Returning to our earlier discussion, such an approach is appropriate to the nature 
of the Möbius subject, who is at once individual and social, whose extimate origins 
are both external and immanent, whose excessive constitution retains an 
unassimilable kernel of the unknowable real, the other, alongside its more visible 
imaginary and symbolic dimensions. This Möbius educational subject’s 
simultaneous and paradoxical embodiment of singularity, plurality, and difference 
exposes the inadequacies of an education grounded in discourses of mastery and 
instead demands engagement with the other side of education.
References
Agamben, G. (1998). Homo sacer: Sovereign power and bare life (D. Heller-
Roazen, Trans.). Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
Ball, S. (2012). Global education inc: New policy networks and the neo-liberal 
imaginary. London: Routledge.
Benjamin, J. (1998). Shadow of the other: Intersubjectivity and gender in 
psychoanalysis. New York: Routledge.
Biesta, G. (2006). Beyond learning: Democratic education for a human future. 
Boulder, CO: Paradigm Publishers.
The Other Side of Education
58
Biesta, G. (2010). Good education in age of measurement: Ethics, politics, 
democracy. Boulder, CO: Paradigm Publishers.
Boucher, G. (2006). Bureaucratic speech acts and the university discourse: Lacan's 
theory of modernity. In J. Clemens & R. Grigg (Eds.), Jacques Lacan and the 
other side of psychoanalysis (pp. 274-291). Durham, NC: Duke University 
Press.
Bracher, M. (1993). Lacan, discourse, and social change: A psychoanalytic cultural 
criticism. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
Bracher, M. (1994). On the psychological and social functions of language: Lacan's 
theory of the four discourses. In M. Bracher, M. W. Alcorn, Jr., R. J. Corthell, & 
F. Massardier-Kenney (Eds.), Lacanian theory of discourse: Subject, structure 
and society (pp. 107-128). New York: New York University Press.
Bracher, M. (2006). Radical pedagogy: Identity, generativity and social 
transformation. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
Britzman, D. (2009). The very thought of education: Psychoanalysis and the 
impossible professions. Albany: State University of New York Press.
Brown, T., Atkinson, D., & England, J. (2006). Regulatory discourses in education: 
A Lacanian perspective. New York: Peter Lang.
Campbell, K. (2004). Jacques Lacan and feminist epistemology. London: 
Routledge.
Clarke, M. (2012). The (absent) politics of neoliberal education policy. Critical 
Studies in Education.
Clemens, J., & Grigg, R. (2006). Introduction. In J. Clemens & R. Grigg (Eds.), 
Jacques Lacan and the other side of psychoanalysis (pp. 1-7). Durham, NC: 
Duke University Press.
Crouch, C. (2011). The strange non-death of neoliberalism. Cambridge: Polity 
Press.
Dean, J. (2006). Žižek's politics. New York: Routledge.
Eagleton, T. (1990). The ideology of the aesthetic. Oxford: Blackwell.
Elster, J. (1983). Sour grapes: Studies in the subversion of rationality. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press.
Fielding, M., & Moss, P. (2011). Radical education and the common school: A 
democratic alternative. London: Routledge.
Fink, B. (1995). The Lacanian subject: Between language and jouissance. 
Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Gove, M. (2012, June 26). How are the children? Achievement for all in the 21st 
Century. Speech at the Spectator Conference: London, United Kingdom.
Grosz, E. (1990). Lacan: A feminist introduction. London: Routledge.




Lacan, J. (2007). Seminar XVII: The other side of psychoanalysis (R. Grigg, 
Trans.). New York: Norton.
Rancière, J. (2010). On ignorant schoolmasters. In C. Bingham & G. Biesta (Eds.), 
Jacques Rancière: Education, truth, emancipation (pp. 1-24). London: 
Continuum.
Rothenberg, M. A. (2010). The excessive subject: A new theory of social change. 
Cambridge: Polity Press.
Salacl, R. (1994). Deference to the great other: The discourse of education. In M. 
Bracher, M. Alcorn, R. Corthell & F. Massardier-Kenney (Eds.), Lacanian 
theory of discourse: Subject, structure and society (pp. 163-175). New York: 
New York University Press.
Sharpe, M., & Boucher, G. (2010). Žižek and politics: A critical introduction. 
Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.
Taubman, P. (2009). Teaching by numbers: Deconstructing the discourse of 
standards and accountability in education. New York: Routledge.
Todd, S. (2009). Toward an imperfect education: Facing humanity, rethinking 
cosmopolitanism. Boulder, CO: Paradigm Publishers.
Van Haute, P. (2002). Against adaptation: Lacan's "subversion" of the subject (P. 
Crowe & P. Vankerk, Trans.). New York: Other Press.
Wells, G. (1999). Dialogic inquiry: Towards a sociocultural practice and theory of 
education. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Žižek, S. (1996). The fetish of the party. In W. Apollon & R. Feldstein (Eds.), 
Lacan, politics, aesthetics. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press.
Žižek, S. (2006). Object a in social links. In J. Clemens & R. Grigg (Eds.), Jacques 
Lacan and the other side of psychoanalysis (pp. 107-128). Durham, NC: Duke 
University Press.
Žižek, S. (2008). For they know not what they do: Enjoyment as a political factor.
(2nd ed.). London: Verso.
=XSDQþLþ$:KHQVXUSOXVHQMR\PHQWPHHWVVXUSOXVYDOXH,QJ. Clemens & 
R. Grigg (Eds.), Jacques Lacan and the other side of psychoanalysis (pp. 155-
178). Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
Acknowledgements
Thanks are extended to Ray Misson and Kalervo Gulson for their insightful 
comments on earlier drafts of this paper.
Author Details
Matthew Clarke is a Senior Lecturer in the School of Education at the University of 
New South Wales in Sydney, Australia. Contact address: School of Education, 
Goodsell Building, The University of New South Wales, Sydney, NSW 2052, 
Australia. E-mail: m.clarke@unsw.edu.au
The Other Side of Education
60
© Copyright 2012. The author, Matthew Clarke, assigns to Other Education: The 
Journal of Educational Alternatives, and to educational and non-profit institutions a 
non-exclusive license to use this document for personal use and in courses of 
instruction, provided that the article is used in full and this copyright statement is 
reproduced. The author also grants a non-exclusive right to Other Education: The 
Journal of Educational Alternatives to publish this document in full on the World 
Wide Web. Any other usage is prohibited without the express permission of the 
author.
